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ABSTRACT:   
Historically, the European Commission has followed an expert-based 
depoliticized route to gain attention for policy issues and the credibility to deal 
with them. Given growing politicization, we ask whether the Commission might 
increasingly seek citizens’ views and whether there is patterned variation. We 
provide the first mapping of special Eurobarometers, the massive instrument for 
issue-specific public opinion. We found a steep increase and a curvilinear pattern: 
public opinion is rarely invited in areas of exclusive European Union 
competencies and exclusive national competencies. Most special Eurobarometers 
focus on shared competencies. Citizens are almost never asked about expenditure 
programmes and never on immigration. There is large variation across the 
Directorates General, which is only weakly related to the amount of planned 
legislation and the number of expert committees. Business-oriented Directorates 
General are much less likely to seek public opinion. These results open up 
promising avenues for research on agenda-setting strategies at times of 
politicization. 
 
Keywords Agenda-setting, Eurobarometer, European Commission, legitimacy, 
politicisation, public opinion 
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‘EU Agriculture Commissioner Dacian Cioloș welcomed the EUROBAROMETER poll's findings, 
stating today: ‘I have always underlined that the CAP is not just for farmers, but for all EU 
citizens. This poll confirms that some of the key concepts of our reform …have wide public 
support.’ (European Commission 2011: 1) 
 
‘It is important to remember that the Eurobarometer is an instrument created and financed by a 
political institution. It is therefore inconceivable that it could somehow damage that institution 
with the publication of adverse results in this regard’ (Signorelli 2012: 69) 
 
Introduction  
The European Commission has privileged access to agenda-setting. Historically, the 
Commission followed a depoliticised route to gain attention for policy issues and 
credibility to deal with them. The Commission typically relied on selected experts from 
member state governments, interest groups and scientific institutions. This practice has 
been arguably enabled and legitimised by the existence of broad, though diffuse, citizen 
support for European integration. Over the last decades however, this ‘permissive 
consensus’ has been replaced by increased politicisation and lower levels of trust in 
European Union (EU) institutions (see e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2009). Against this 
background, we wonder whether actors in the Commission increasingly reach out to the 
public, not in the sense of actually mobilizing citizens, but in seeking public opinion 
through surveys on specific topics. The Commissions’ Directorates-General (DGs) could 
use this public opinion, on issues they want to move forward, to signal popular legitimacy 
to other actors in the decision-making process.  
The Commission ran surveys since the early 1970s to enquire about general 
problem perceptions and attitudes towards the EU (standard Eurobarometers). Parts of 
these very comprehensive surveys contain batteries of questions on concrete policy issues 
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and the appropriate political level to deal with them. The results are communicated in 
comprehensive and publicly available reports (European Commission n.d.). The potential 
of these so-called special Eurobarometers (special EBs) as a resource in EU decision-
making seems obvious: a Special EB demonstrating that a large majority of ‘European’ 
citizens wants the EU to act on a specific policy topic or supports the Commission’s 
solution to a policy problem would be a powerful resource for the Commission. Despite 
their resource potential, Special EBs have so far received no systematic attention in the 
literature. 
In this article, we will document the development of Special EBs over time. Since 
the Commission can choose the topics for Special EBs, but cannot prevent publishing the 
results if these are deemed unfavourable, we will investigate which topics have been 
included in the Special EBs and which have been neglected. In addition, we will analyse 
whether the Commission is more likely to seek public opinion in areas where it has 
comparatively more competencies or in areas where it has weak or no competencies.  
Additionally, we will zoom in on the DG level. Are some DGs more likely to 
invite citizens’ opinion than others? Are DGs who invite more citizen opinion also more 
active in terms of agenda-setting activities, such as planned legislative proposals? Do 
DGs who rely on expert group input rely less or more on public opinion as an alternative 
input source? And finally, do non-governmental (NGO)-oriented DGs, who are more 
susceptible to public frames, invite more public opinion than business-oriented DGs?  
To be sure, there have already been critical examinations of the Eurobarometer 
surveys. However, these studies typically concern methodological issues such as 
sampling problems and cultural biases (e.g., Saris and Kaase 1997). The study by Höpner 
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and Jurczyk (2012) takes a more ‘political’ approach, by linking methodological 
problems with a potential pro-integration bias of the Commission. This study did focus 
however, on the framing of questions and not on the selection of topics. 
Hence, the goal of the article is to systematically map public opinion seeking 
through Special EBs along a number of dimensions. Although these dimensions are 
theoretically informed, we do not aim to causally explain the temporal or cross-sectional 
patterns found. Causal analysis often implies a more narrow focus, limited by the 
demands of a specific theoretical debate (Gerring 2012). Though we fully agree that 
causal explanation is the core task of the social sciences, we side with Gerring (2012) that 
discerning descriptive patterns is an important scientific task in its own right. 
Comprehensive description is particularly valid when it concerns phenomena that are 
intrinsically relevant and where knowledge is limited, such as public opinion seeking 
through Special EBs. It is in this spirit that we have cast our net wide in this article.  
The next section will embed our endeavour in the agenda-setting literature and 
substantiate our selection of dimensions for mapping the Special EBs. We will then 
provide background information about the Eurobarometer surveys and further elaborate 
on the coding of Special EBs. This is followed by the empirical analysis. In the 
conclusion, we sketch research questions for future research.  
 
Agenda-setting in the EU: from a depoliticised route to public opinion?  
The literature on agenda-setting in the EU has emphasized that the European Commission 
has followed a technocratic depoliticised route to agenda-setting, resulting into a 
‘creeping’ task expansion of the EU (Pollack 1994; see also Princen and Rhinard 2006; 
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Wallace and Smith 1995). To get attention to the issues it wants to move on and to build 
credibility as the actor to do so, the Commission utilises both Commission expert 
committees, wherein scientific experts, member state civil servants and specialists from 
interest group are supposed to provide non-partisan advice, and stakeholder consultations 
(Gornitzka & Sverdrup 2011; Haverland & Liefferink 2012; Kohler-Koch et al. 2013; 
Rimkute & Haverland 2015; Van Schendelen 2003; Wille 2013).  
There is ample case study evidence that the Commission has acted as a skilful 
policy entrepreneur, using its garnered expertise, and its advantage of institutional 
persistence, its unique position as process manager, and its ample mediating skills to 
exploit emerging windows of opportunity (Heritier 1997; Pollack 1997: 125-6, Smyrl 
1998; Wonka 2008: 1146). For instance, Cram has observed that the Commission has 
acted as a ‘purposeful opportunist’, that is, as ‘an organization which has a notion of 
overall objectives and aims, but is quite flexible as to the mean of achieving them’ (1993: 
143). Even when the Commission has been in a constitutionally weak position, such as in 
the social policy area, its officials have at times proved strategists, ‘able to marshal 
innocuous-looking instruments to achieve surprising results’ (Wendon, 1998: 340).  
These low politics agenda dynamics, revealed in studies focusing on the 1970s 
and 1980s, reasoned well with the ‘permissive consensus’ of citizens on the benefits of 
EU integration that characterised the EU until the early 1990s (Hooghe and Marks 2009). 
Therefore, it comes to no surprise that  
[w]hereas …public opinion play[s] important roles in studies of domestic agenda 
setting processes, they are hardly mentioned let alone analysed systematically in 
studies of EU agenda-setting (Princen 2011: 940) 
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In recent years however, the EU can no longer build on the diffuse support of its 
citizens. The EU has become more salient to voters and present in the media and 
subsequently has become an issue of domestic party competition, as demonstrated by a 
rise in Eurosceptic parties. The ‘permissive consensus’ has been replaced by a 
‘constraining dissensus’ and complaints about the democratic deficit of the EU have 
increased (Hooghe & Marks 2009; see also Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011). This 
change has inspired studies on the EU priorities of the general public (e.g. Bevan, 
Jennings and Wlezien 2016), on the link between public opinion and EU policy-making 
(e.g. Toshkov 2011, Bolstad 2015) and on the agenda responsiveness of the European 
Council (Alexandrova, Rasmussen and Toshkov 2016). This study focuses on public 
opinion as a tool for the European Commission in agenda-setting activities. As the 
Commission consists of unelected officials, it may have a particularly strong incentive to 
consider citizens’ views. Hence, citizen support may become an important resource in 
agenda-setting, in addition to expert and stakeholder involvement (Haverland 2013). It 
could be used to substitute the direct electoral link with citizens, as a weak form of ‘input 
legitimacy’ (Scharpf 1999). Therefore, Directorates General in the Commission may 
invite public opinion to signal popular legitimacy to other DGs, as well as to the Council 
and to the EP further down the road of decision-making. The Special EB might not be the 
innocuous instrument it appears at first glance.  
 A systematic plausibility probe is needed to assess the probability that public 
opinion could be a tool for ‘input legitimacy’ in the Commission’s agenda-setting 
behaviour. Such a probe would require both a mapping of the overall picture of variation 
7 
 
in the Commission’s public opinion seeking behaviour and a more in-depth mapping of 
the differences between DGs within the Commission.  
First, the topics on which the Commission invites public opinion need to be 
mapped. The agenda-setting literature argues that political actors seek to use the agenda-
setting stage to gain attention to issues they are interested in and to gain the credibility to 
deal with them (see Princen 2011: 929-930). In terms of public opinion, one would 
expect that the Commission focuses its public opinion seeking on areas of weak or no 
competencies, as there is a more pressing need to gain attention and credibility for these 
topics. To shed more light on topic selection, we relate the frequency of topics in the 
Special EBs to the treaty competencies of the EU and analyse whether the Commission is 
more likely to seek public opinion in areas where it has comparatively more 
competencies or in areas where it has weak or no competencies.  
Second, bureaucratic politics within the Commission influence the overall 
agenda-setting activities of the Commission (Hartlapp et al. 2014). In what is probably 
the most comprehensive study of more recent agenda-setting activities within the 
Commission, Hartlapp and her collaborators hypothesized public legitimacy as one of the 
factors affecting DG power in the Commission’s internal position formation processes 
(Hartlapp et al. 2014). They systematically compared 48 legislative proposals, which 
were adopted between 1999 and 2009 and which spanned three policy areas. Public 
legitimacy was among the factors which shaped nine of those proposals. For some of 
these cases, officials have confirmed that Special EBs have been explicitly commissioned 
to support the position of the DG (ibid.: 235). As Special EB are requested by individual 
DGs, we can compare the frequency of public opinion-seeking across components of the 
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Commission. Are some DGs more likely to invite citizens’ opinion than others? Is this 
related to DGs’ activism in terms of agenda-setting activities or by the reliance on other 
input sources (such as expert groups and NGOs–business actors) 
To gain a more fine-grained picture of the role of bureaucratic politics within 
opinion seeking behaviour, we focus on three dimensions that distinguish DGs from each 
other. To start, we compare the variation in Special EB requests by DGs to the number of 
planned legislative proposals per DG. After all, those DGs that have a more active 
legislative agenda might also more frequently gather public opinion. In addition, we 
compare the established variation with the degree to which the DG relies on expert 
groups - the main alternative source of input. Finally, previous research and expert 
surveys have pointed out that some DGs are more business-oriented, while others are 
more NGO-oriented (Bernhagen et al. 2015). In a similar vein, some DGs are supposed 
to be receptive to an economic interest frame, while others are more receptive to a public 
interest frame (Klüver et al. 2015). Our hunch is that business-oriented DGs will 
undertake less effort to seek public opinion as compared to NGO-oriented DGs. One 
could argue that ‘business-friendly’ DGs derive their legitimacy primarily from business 
support and are therefore less dependent on public opinion. NGO-oriented DGs on the 
other hand, are more receptive to a public interest frame and have more stake in public 
opinion.  
 
The Eurobarometer: Standard and Special  
The Eurobarometer (EB) is conducted on a regular basis since 1973. It is probably the 
most comprehensive government-led enquiry into public opinion worldwide. Questions 
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are posed to a representative sample of about 1,000 citizens per member state at least two 
times a year.
1
 The EB is co-ordinated by the Commission, more specifically by the DG 
Communication, and currently carried out by Taylor Nelson Sofres  (TNS) Opinion and 
Social. The Standard Eurobarometer consists of a set of ‘trend’ questions that are posed 
repeatedly over time, such as attitudes towards European integration and socio-
demographic characteristics (GESIS n.d.). The Standard EB does entail some questions 
about the relative salience of policy problems broadly defined.  
However, the large-scale surveys conducted under the label Eurobarometer do not 
only contain the above-mentioned categories of questions. In fact, citizens are also 
surveyed on a great variety of specific policy topics. Typically, batteries of questions 
regarding these specific topics are requested by various DGs of the European 
Commission, or sometimes other EU institutions, for in-depth thematic studies (about 
100 pages long). These batteries are the Special EBs (Signorelli 2012: 26). According to 
an official of the Commission’s Eurobarometer Unit, the final list of questions is decided 
on a high hierarchical level involving for instance the heads of the Commissioners’ 
cabinets and highly ranked communication advisors. Selection of the final list is based on 
the Commission priorities, which currently include employment and growth. The official 
felt unable to comment on the pre-Barroso period, though he expected the process to be 
more decentralized (European Commission 2014).  
We focus on the Special Eurobarometer as it is the Commission’s main and a 
massive instrument for seeking public opinion on specific policy topics.
 2
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Coding Special Eurobarometers 
This article provides a systematic description of dimensions of all Special EBs conducted 
from 1970 until December 2014, marking the end of the second Barroso term. The 
population of Special EB reports, 399 in total, is available through the Commission’s 
website (European Commission n.d).
 
The website mentions both the dates of the 
fieldwork for the survey and the publication of report, which allows tracing of the 
frequency of these surveys over time.  
First, we have coded the topics according to the EU codebook of the Comparative 
Agenda Setting Project (Alexandrova et al. 2013). The topics of the Special EB were 
inferred from the title of the reports. If the title was ambiguous, the report was 
downloaded and read. The topics were coded manually by two researchers independently. 
In a second step, we have converted the data according to the definition of policy areas 
provided by the Lisbon Treaty, which was adopted in 2007 and enacted in 2009 (see 
Table 1). We grouped the policy areas in five competency levels, using the terminology 
of the Lisbon Treaty: exclusive competencies of the EU, shared competencies, specific 
arrangement, national competencies – EU supports, and exclusive competencies of the 
member states. This allows us to map the frequency of topics on the division of 
competencies between the EU and the member states and to check whether there is a 
relationship between the degree of EU integration in an area and the number of Special 
EBs commissioned by the Commission. Furthermore, we checked when (i.e.. year of 
Treaty enactment) each policy area roughly ‘reached’ the identified competency level, in 
order to identify whether Eurobarometers have been requested before or after the EU 
gained that competency level.  
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 In a third step, we coded the name of the DG which requested the Special EB. All 
Special EB reports, save one, contain the name of the DG which requested the Special 
EB. In addition, 15 reports (4 per cent) are not available for download, thereby resulting 
in missing values for the DG requesting the EB and in some cases for the topic as well, as 
the title was too ambiguous to infer the topic code. For labelling the DGs, we could not 
always use their proper names at the time when the Special EBs were requested. 
Otherwise, it would not be possible to study DGs over a long period.
3
 The portfolio of the 
Barroso I Commission informs our labelling. This implies that for instance that we pool 
the data for DG Energy and DG Move into the category DG ‘Energy and Transport’, for 
DG Home and DG Justice into ‘DG Justice, Freedom and Security’, for DG Agriculture 
and Rural Development and DG Fisheries into ‘DG Agriculture’ and for DG 
Environment and DG Climate Change into ‘DG Environment’. 
 
Increase in the production of public opinion? 
The first question we posed was whether the European Commission increasingly seeks 
public opinion through Special EBs. Indeed, the population of Special EBs has increased 
dramatically over time. Before the 1990s, hardly more than five Special EBs a year have 
been conducted. In the 1990s, the average was almost 10 Special EBs a year, and in the 
2000s the average further increased to almost 20 (see Figure 1). From the 1980s onwards, 
each Commission has executed more Special EBs than its predecessors, with the 
exception of the short-lived Delors III Commission. The results also show increased 
requests of the European Parliament, and occasionally other actors, for Special EBs. For 
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the remainder of the article however, we want to focus on the European Commission, 
which is responsible for 367 of the 399 Special EBs.  
 
 
Figure 1: Number of special EBs a year per presidency. 
Source: European Commission (1970-2014), own calculations, total: 399
4
 
 
Topics addressed and neglected 
The second question we posed was whether the Commission invited public opinion in 
areas in which it has exclusive or shared competencies or in areas with weak or no 
competencies. 
As explained in the coding section, we mapped the frequency of topics on the 
division of competencies between the EU and the member states in order to whether a 
relationship exists between the degree of EU integration in an area and the number of 
Special EBs commissioned. In addition, we distinguished Eurobarometers that were 
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requested before the policy area ‘gained’ the competency level, as identified in the 
Lisbon Treaty, from Eurobarometers that were requested after the policy area gained its 
current competency level.  
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Table 1: Topics addressed in Eurobarometer mapped on division of competencies 
 Nr of Special EBs 
since Lisbon 
competence level 
achieved 
Nr of Special EBs 
prior to Lisbon 
competence level  
Nr of 
Special EBs  
per area in 
total 
Level of 
competence 
since roughly 
Exclusive competences of European Union 
Competition 0 0 0 1958 
Common Commercial Policy (External trade ) 3 0 3 1958 
Conservation of marine biological resources  0 0 0 2009 
Customs union 0 0 0 1958 
Monetary policy  6 0 6 1993 
ECU: 1958 
Shared competences     
Agriculture and fisheries. 27 0 27 1958 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 37 2 39 1993 
Consumer protection 13 2 15 1993 
Development cooperation and humanitarian aid 18 0 18 1958 
Economic, social and territorial cohesion;` 4 0 4 1958 
Energy  2 12 14 2009  
Nuclear: 1958 
Environment 18 2 20 1987 
Internal market 21 0 21 1958 
Public health as defined in TFEU 23 6 29 1993 
Research, technological development and space 28 2 30 1987 
Social policy, as defined in TFEU (social 
regulation) 
6 0 6 1958 
Transport 8 0 8 1958 
 
Specific arrangements 
Common foreign and security policy 
6 1 
 
7 
1993 
Defense: 2003 
Coordination of economic policies 6 1 7 1993 
Coordination of employment policies 5 3 8 1999 
Coordination of social policy 7 5 12 1999 
 
National Competencies – EU supports 
Civil protection 1 1 2 2009 
Culture 3 0 3 1993 
Education 2 3 5 2009 
Protection and improvement of human health 3 6 9 2009 
Sport  1 3 4 2009 
Tourism 0 2 2 2009 
Vocational training 1 0 1 1993 
Youth 0 2 2 2009 
 
Exclusive Competencies Member States 
Housing and Urban Development
a 0 0 0 n.a 
Public Lands and Watermanagement
a 0 0 0 n.a 
a Added by authors, not mentioned in the TFEU 
   
    
Source: European Commission (1970-2014), own calculation, total: 303 (see endnote 6.5  
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Overall, we find a roughly curvilinear pattern with relatively fewer Special EBs in areas 
where the EU already has far reaching competencies and in areas where either policy 
issues are clearly (sub-) national or the EU involvement is limited to “support” the 
execution of the national competence. The lion’s share of Special EBs is conducted in 
areas of shared competencies. 
Starting with the EUs exclusive competencies we identified not a single Special 
EB for either common commercial policy, competition policy (merger control, etc.), and 
common fisheries policy (conservation of marine biological resources). The EU has 
strong competencies in these areas since 1958. Six Special EBs have dealt with monetary 
policy, specifically with the ECU or the EURO. None of them were requested after 2002 
however, despite the evolving crisis in the Eurozone since 2008.
6
 Overall, the European 
Commission does not prioritise public opinion in areas where the EU (already) has 
exclusive competencies. 
The same holds for areas of exclusive member state competencies. No Special 
EBs have been conducted on housing and urban development or public lands and water 
management. A few Special EBs have been conducted in areas that, until Lisbon, have 
been exclusive national competencies and where the EU now “supports” national action. 
Most of these EBs have been requested prior to that treaty change. Special EBs on the 
protection of human health are the most frequent in this category, with six prior and three 
after it has assumed “EU support” competency level in the Lisbon treaty.  
Moving ‘up the ladder’ again towards more integrated areas, we arrive at the so-
called specific arrangements. Specific arrangements use intergovernmental bargaining 
and coordination, rather the Community method for decision-making. In terms of 
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economic coordination, six Special EBs have been conducted since the EU assumed 
specific arrangements in this area. Some of these EBs deal with rather prosaic issues, 
such as the European citizens’ knowledge of economic indicators. There has never been a 
Special EB on the budget. This implies that at least up to 2015, the Commission did not 
invite citizens to provide their opinion on the economic crisis in the Eurozone and recent 
European economic governance policies through the Special Eurobarometer. Note 
however, that two Special EBs on the economic crisis have been conducted on behalf of 
the European Parliament.
7
 The Commission has been more active in the area of social 
policies, in the sense of welfare state policies, which are since the Amsterdam Treaty 
(1999) subject to the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). There are twelve Special 
EBs in total, with some of them dealing with poverty and social exclusion. Most of the 
eight Special EB in the area of employment policies are close to social issues as well. 
Almost half of the Special EBs in these two areas precede the establishment of 
competencies in the Amsterdam Treaty. Only seven Special EBs focus on security and 
foreign policy, six of them after Maastricht has created the second pillar. Note that the 
Commission never conducted a Special EB on defence.  
The lion’s share of Special EBs is conducted in the areas of shared competencies. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, many of them concern the single market, the core project of EU 
integration. Twenty-one of them focus on various aspects of the internal market (about 
half of those related to services), taking mostly a consumer perspective. In addition, 
fifteen Special EBs focus on consumer protection in a narrower sense, thirteen of them 
since the Maastricht Treaty turned this area into a shared competence. 
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Many surveys were requested in the area of freedom, security and justice. Thirty-
nine have been adopted and almost all of them in the last decade. Eighteen deal with civil 
rights issues, such as EU citizenship, discrimination and data privacy. Twenty-one deal 
with law and crime issues such as violence and white collar crimes like corruption.  
At the same time, there has not been a single Special EB that has focused on 
immigration issues, such as refugees and asylum, the integration of immigrants, 
acquisition of nationality or border control.  
There are many surveys concerning agriculture, but these surveys have a specific 
focus. Seven of them deal with food safety and seven with biotechnology. However, none 
of the twenty-seven surveys dealt specifically with what might be regarded the core of the 
CAP, agricultural subsidies and the common organisation of agricultural markets. Some 
surveys include issues in these domains, such as ‘capping’, but they are not a prominent 
part of these more general inquiries. This implies that citizen opinion is invited on the 
regulatory aspects of agriculture as opposed to the redistributive aspects of this large 
expenditure program.  
That Special EBs are rather silent on expenditure is further confirmed by the low 
number of Special EBs on cohesion. In addition to two rather generic Special EBs on 
Europe of the Regions there has been only one more directly related to territorial 
cohesion policies, and there has been only one survey on the European Social Funds. 
Both surveys are of older vintage: for the last two decades, citizens’ opinion was not 
invited on the EU cohesion funds, the largest expenditure programs of the EU.  
In terms of timing, almost all Special Eurobarometers have been adopted after the 
member states shared competencies with the European Union. The exception is energy, 
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European citizens have been regularly quizzed about energy security long before the 
Lisbon treaty gave the EU a say in this area.  
 To summarize, Special Eurobarometer have largely been conducted in policy 
areas in which the EU and the member states share competencies, particularly after the 
areas gained their current competency level. No Eurobarometers have been conducted on 
immigration and almost none on the redistributive expenditure programs, even though 
these areas have shared competencies.  
 
Variation within the Commission in gauging public opinion 
The third question we posed was whether variation between DGs exists in terms of public 
opinion seeking behaviour.  
 
The general picture  
As stated above, Special EBs are not requested by the European Commission as such but 
rather by a specific Directorate General (DG). Although the Commission is organised 
according to the principle of functional specialisation, topics are not always ‘owned’ by a 
specific DG. Many topics cut across several DGs, requiring coordination and potentially 
encountering conflict and bureaucratic politics (see e.g., Hartlapp et al. 2014). It is 
therefore worthwhile to map which DG has actually requested the Special EB.  
We found that DGs vary starkly in their effort to gauge public opinion (see Figure 
2). Three DGs are responsible for about half of the Special EBs. Quite a few Special EBs 
are carried out by DG Communication itself. Further analysis reveals that these EBs 
typically focus on general topics or topics that cut across many issues, such as the future 
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of the EU or German re-unification. From the DGs with a policy portfolio, DG 
Employment and Social Affairs and DG Health and Consumer Affairs are the directorates 
who request considerably more Special EBs than the other DGs.  
On the other end, some DGs never or almost never seek the opinion of European 
citizens through Special EBs. The following group of nine DGs are responsible for in 
total less than 5 per cent of all ‘Special EBs (16/352)8: DG Enterprise, DG Regional 
Policy, DG Trade, DG Economic and Finance, DG External Relations, DG Enlargement, 
DG Taxation and Customs Union, DG Competition, and DG Budget. The latter two have 
never requested a Special EB. 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of Special EBs per DG. 
Source: European Commission (1970-2014), own calculations, total no. 352 
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In other words, especially those DGs tasked with economic and foreign affairs issues 
rarely invite the opinion of European citizens. This is consistent with the results of our 
previous section, where we have seen that there are indeed only very few Special EBs in 
the area of foreign and security policies and core areas of economic policies areas such as 
competition policy, external trade policy, taxation and the budget.  
The large number of Special EBs for DG Health and Consumer Protection focuses 
on activities in both core areas of its responsibility: health and consumer protection. 
Surprisingly, this DG is also responsible for 21 out of the 38 Special EBs concerning the 
single market. DG Internal Market and DG Enterprise are only responsible for a total of 
seven of the single market EBs. The large number of Special EBs requested by DG 
Employment and Social Affairs results from the DG’s request of almost all Special EBs 
in the areas of social policy and of employment policy. In addition, this DG is also 
responsible for five of the 14 Special EBs in the category of civil rights, namely those 
focusing on discrimination of, for instance, disabled people.  
Furthermore, a longitudinal perspective suggests that DGs of relative recent 
vintages and tasked with subjects that have not been part of the original EEC Treaty are 
relatively eager to invite public opinion. For example, since Barroso II, the DG in the 
area ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’ has been split into DG Justice and DG Home 
Affairs. Both have started to request Special EBs. In addition, relatively recent DGs 
dealing with the Information Society, Communication Networks and Education and 
Culture have conducted Special EBs from the start.  
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Variation across DGs in context 
To further explore the variation between DGs in their effort to invite public opinion, we 
have taken into account three dimensions. First, we have related the number of Special 
EBs to legislative agenda-setting activities. Perhaps DGs do not invite public opinion, 
because they do not plan new legislation and have no agenda-setting goals. Secondly, we 
have looked at the number of expert committees per DG. It might be that those DGs that 
rely more on input of expert undertake less effort to gather public opinion. And finally we 
have looked at the type of DG, in term of proximity to business and the economic 
framing of issues as opposed to proximity to NGOs and the public framing of issues. For 
reasons of data availability, this analysis will focus on the two Barroso presidencies only 
(2005-2014). We exclude DG Communication in this analysis, because the DG is not 
involved in legislative agenda-setting activities.  
To measure legislative agenda-setting activities, we have taken the number of 
planned proposal per DG announced in the Commission work programs. We consider 
this a relatively valid measure of legislative agenda-setting behaviour, as it ensures better 
comparability across DG’s than for instance the number of white papers, green papers, 
and communications. We use the planned proposal data provided by Osnabrügge (2015). 
Visual inspection reveals that the number of Special EBs are only weakly associated to 
the number of announced proposals (see Figure 3). Additional bi-variate statistical 
analysis confirms this intuition and demonstrates that the association is not statistically 
significant (r = 0.34, sig. 0.13). To be sure, some DGs were both active legislative agenda 
setters and frequently request Special EBs. Examples are DG Health and Consumer 
Protection and DG Justice, Freedom and Security. Others were also relatively active 
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legislative agenda setters but (almost) never invited public opinion. Examples are DG 
Agriculture and Fisheries, DG Economic and Finance, DG Enterprise, DG Internal 
Market, and DG Environment. 
 
 
Figure 3: Special EBs per DG in context. 
Source: Special EBs: European Commission (2005-2014), own calculations, n=176; WP Planned 
proposals (2005-2012), Osnabrügge (2015: 245), n =232; Expert committees (2010), Metz 
(2012), n= 896. Type of interest groups, Bernhagen et al. (2015: 577-578), Klüver et al. (2015: 
490).  
 
Is there a clear pattern when it comes to the sources of input for agenda-setting? 
Examining the results suggests a negative answer (see Figure 3). In general, public 
opinion is not used as an alternative to expert input. If at all, there is a very weak positive 
relationship in the population between the number of Special EBs and the number of 
expert committees per DG, but it is not statistically significant (r = 0.26, sig. 0.26). If we 
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concentrate on those DGs who are rather active legislative agenda setters (> 10 planned 
proposals), two DGs are responsible for a relatively large share of Special EBs in this 
period: DG Health and Consumer and DG Justice, Freedom and Security. They do rely 
less on expert committees but not distinctly less than most others. DG Agriculture, DG 
Enterprise, DG Environment and DG Internal Market rely relatively more on expert 
committees than Special EBs. DG Energy and Transport roughly balances the number of 
Special EBs and the number Expert committees.  
 We have found a rather strong pattern however, when it comes to the type of DG. 
The seven business oriented DGs and the five public/NGO oriented DGs score very 
similar on legislative agenda activity. Directorate-Generals in both groups are on average 
responsible for seven per cent of the work program proposals. Yet, the business-oriented 
DGs on average commissioned two per cent of all Special EBs in the period under study, 
while the public/NGO-oriented DGs commissioned on average ten per cent of all Special 
EBs. A comparison of means test demonstrates that a statistical significant result, despite 
the small number of observations (Eta = 0.75, sig. 0.005).  
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
Against the background of an increased politicisation of the EU, this article presents the 
first systematic description of public opinion seeking through Special EBs. We found that 
the amount of Special EBs has dramatically increased from almost none in the 80’s to 
around 15 a year in the 2000’s. The effort to seek public opinion through Special EBs is 
however not equally distributed across policy areas. Generally, citizens are not often 
invited to voice their opinion in areas in which the EU either already has far reaching 
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competencies, such as external trade and competition, or areas in which the EU has none, 
such as public lands and water management. Citizen input is foremost sought in areas of 
shared competencies. Citizens are largely kept silent when it comes to EU expenditure 
and there has never been a Special EB on immigration.  
We also see a large variation between DGs. DG Communication, DG 
Employment and Social Affairs, and DG Health and Consumer Affairs are responsible 
for almost half of all Special EBs. Most DGs who focus on economic issues and issues of 
external affairs almost never request Special EBs. The variation is only weakly associated 
with legislative agenda-setting activity, in terms of planned legislative proposals. No 
clear pattern is visible in DGs’ relative reliance on public opinion and on expert advice in 
terms of number expert committees. However, a strong pattern emerges when it comes to 
the DGs proximity to business interests versus NGOs. The ‘business-friendly’ DGs are 
on average five times less likely to invite public opinion than NGO-oriented DGs, 
although they work on a similar number of legislative proposals. 
This systematic description of the important, but neglected phenomenon of the 
Commission’s public opinion seeking through Special EBs raises puzzles which merit 
further research. Can the curvilinear relationship between the degree of EU competencies 
and the frequency of Special EBs be married with an agenda-setting perspective? To be 
sure, it fits our expectation that the Commission has shown little appetite to inquire 
citizens’ opinion in areas of exclusive EU competencies. However, why has the 
Commission not been more active in areas that belong to the national domain? That 
Special EBs are most frequent in areas where competencies are shared suggests a more 
subtle relationship than initially expected. The Commission invites public opinion as a 
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resource in areas where its agenda-setting authority is neither obvious nor unachievable 
and where it is in clear competition with the member state for gaining attention and 
credibility. There is additional variation that requires further research. 
Can variation be explained by characteristics of the policy area and the likelihood 
of public opinion results that are to the liking of the Commission? Will this explain why 
the Commission eschews surveys on redistributive issues, which relatively visibly 
produce winners and losers? Will this explain the neglect of immigration issues, which 
may touch too much on identity and therefore be classified as too sensitive? These 
puzzles open up promising avenues for research on agenda-setting strategies at times of 
politicisation. 
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Notes  
                                                 
1
 The exceptions are Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus with about 500 interviews per 
country. 
2
 In addition, since 2000, Flash EBs have also been conducted. They consist of telephone 
interviews, rather than face-to-face contact and often focus on specific target groups, such 
as entrepreneurs or “the youths”, or on one or a few countries. Therefore they pose 
difficulties in terms of comparability of topics over time. There were 405 Flash EBs until 
November 2014. Given their small-scale focus, they are unlikely to carry similar weight 
as the Special EBs. We have initially included them in the analysis but we found no 
patterns that would contravene our conclusions from the Special EBs. There have also 
been 32 qualitative studies under the umbrella Eurobarometer. Given their small number, 
small scope and the diversity of topics addresses and of initiating DGs, they do not 
impact our conclusions either.  
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3
 Since the start of the Eurobarometer in the early 1970s, new DGs have been created, 
DGs have been split up, DG have assumed new tasks and discarded old ones, and 
accordingly the number, their tasks and their names have constantly changed.  
4
 The start and end dates of each EC presidency were found on:  
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2004-2009/president/history/. Eight Special 
EBs were commissioned by the European Parliament and retrieved from:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00191b53ff/Eurobarometer.html  
5
 We focused on the 367 Special EBs that are commissioned by the European 
Commission (in general or by a specific DG). However, 40 Special EBs are too general 
to be meaningfully coded into one of the categories of the Agenda setting codebook, such 
as ‘social climate’. We excluded those that focus on EU Governance and Government 
Operations as such (327->308). Due to additional considerations provided in the Online 
Appendix, the final number analysed amounts to 303. 
6
 Note however that since 2000 Flash EBs yearly monitor public perceptions concerning 
Euro-related issues for Euro-zone citizens (Commission n.d.). 
7
 Note also that the yearly Flash EBs concerning Euro-related issues also contain 
questions about European economic governance (Commission n.d.). 
8
 We were unable to identify the responsible DG for 15 Special EBs, because these EBs 
were not available for download.  
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Online Appendix. Linking EU Competencies and Categories of EU 
Codebook
2
  
 
Lisbon Treaty Agenda codes - 
Main topic 
Agenda 
code 
Agenda codes - 
Subtopic (or ‘search 
term’)  
Agenda 
subcodes 
EU 
competen
cy code  
Year 
Level of 
Lisbon 
com-
petence  
Exclusive competences of European Union 
 
Customs union Banking, Finance , 
Internal Trade 
15 ‘Customs Union' 1500: 
Customs 
union 
1 1957 
(1958) 
Competition 
 
Banking, Finance , 
Internal Trade 
15 Competition Policy,  
State Aid 
1540 en 1541  2 1957 
(1958) 
Monetary policy 
for the Euro-
countries 
Macro-economics 1 European Monetary 
System (Euro) 
104 3 1992 
(1993) 
The conservation 
of marine 
biological 
resources  
Agriculture and Fisheries 4 ‘Common Fisheries 
policy' 
408 4 1957 
(1958) 
Common 
Commercial 
Policy (External 
trade ) 
Foreign Trade 18  all 5 1957 
(1958) 
Shared competences 
 
Internal market 
 
Banking, Finance , Internal 
Trade 
15 All, except Consumer 
Protection, Tourism, 
Competition, State Aid  
1500, 1501, 
1502, 1504, 
1505, 1507, 
1521, 1522, 
1526, 1530, 
1542, 1595, 
1598, 1599 
6 
1957 
(1958) 
Social policy, as 
defined in TFEU 
(Social 
Regulation  
Labour and Employment 5  Worker Safety and 
Protection, Working 
Conditions, Gender 
Equality at the 
Workplace  
501, 505, 202 7 1957 
(1958) 
Economic, social 
and territorial 
cohesion; 
Social Policy 13 ‘European Social 
Fund') 
1300: ESF 8 1957 
(1958) 
Regional Policy 14 Cohesion Policy and 
Structural Funds  
1420 
Agriculture  Agriculture and Fisheries 4 All, except ‘Common 4, except 408 9  
                                                 
2
 According to the codebook, the five Special EB’s on EU citizen’s perception of German reunification fall into ‘Public 
Lands and Watermanagement’ as they concern territorial issues. We excluded them here because we believe that they 
do not really deal with (sub-) national issues as understood here. We added five Special EB’s about ‘Sport’ and 1 for 
Youth. These EB fall under the category ‘Miscellaneous’, a category which is as such excluded because the themes are 
too general (see Footnote 6), but we felt that these five EB’s are specific enough to be included here.  
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Fisheries Policies’ 
Environment Environment 7 All  7  10 1986 
(1987) 
Consumer 
protection 
Banking, Finance , Internal 
Trade 
15 Consumer Protection 1525 11 1992 
(1993) 
Transport Transportation 10 All  10 12 1957 
(1958) 
Energy since  Energy 8 All  8 13 2007 
(2009) 
Area of 
Freedom, 
Security and 
Justice 
 
Civil rights, Minority 
Issues, Civil Liberties) 
2 All, except some 202 
(gender equality at the 
workplace)  
2, except 
some 202 
14 1992 
(1993) 
Law and Order)  12 All 12 
 Immigration 9 All 9 
Public health as 
defined in TFEU 
Health 3 Subtopics dealing with 
public health issues  
Some 300 and 
399, 331, 333, 
341, 343 
15 1992 
(1993) 
Research, 
technological 
development and 
space 
 
Space, Science 
Technology and 
Communication 
17 All  17 16 1986 
(1987) 
Development 
cooperation and 
humanitarian aid 
International Affairs and 
Foreign Aid 
19 Foreign Aid 1901 17 1957 
(1958) 
 
Specific arrangements 
Coordination of 
economic 
policies 
Macro-economics 1 All, except Monetary 
Policy  
1, except 
subcode 104 
18 1992 
(1993) 
Co-ordination of 
employment 
policies  
Labour and Employment 
5 All. except Worker 
Safety and Protection, 
Working Conditions 
5, except 
subscodes 
501 and 505 
and 506 
19 1997 
(1999) 
Coordination of 
social policy 
Social Policy 13 All, except 'Social 
Fund' 
13, except 
ESF 1300 
20 1997 
(1999) 
Common foreign 
and security 
policy 
International Affairs 
19  All, except Foreign Aid 
(6)  
19, except 
subcode 1901 
 
16 
21 
1992 
(1993) 
Defence 
2003 Defence 16 All 
Exclusive national competencies (part EU supports) 
Protection and 
improvement of 
human health 
Health 3 All, except public 
health issues 
3, except 
public health 
(see 
competency 
code 15)  
22 2007 
(2009) 
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Culture Culture and Media 23 All 23 23 1992 
(1993) 
Tourism 
 
Banking, Finance , Internal 
Trade 
15 
Tourism 
1524  2007 
(2009) 
Education 
 
Education  6   25 2007 
(2009) 
Vocational 
training 
Education and Labour and 
Employment  
5 and 
6 
General references to 
life-long learning on 
the job, vocational 
education and 
employment training  
600 (when 
related to 
lifelong 
learning) and 
604, 502 
26 1999 or 
older 
Sport  Miscellaneous  99 Sport in title  Some 99  27 2007(20
09) 
Youth  Labour and Employment, 
miscellaneous 
5 and 
99 
Youth employment and 
references to youth in 
the title  
506 28 2007 
(2009) 
Civil protection; 
 
EU Governance and 
Government Operations 
20 Civil Protection 2018 29 2007 
(2009) 
Housing and 
Urban 
Development 
Regional and Urban Policy 
and Planning 
14 All, except Europe of 
the Region and 
Structural Funds 
14 except for 
1420 and 
Europe of the 
Regions 
30 1957 
(1958) 
Public Lands and 
Watermanageme
nt 
Public Lands, 
Watermanagement and 
Territorial Issues  
21 All, except territorial 
Issues 
21, except 
2105 
31 1957 
(1958) 
 
 
 
